Chapter 173-446 WAC: Cap-and-Invest Offsets Rulemaking Formal Comment Period

Jordan,

In preparation for the approval of the ODS protocol revision (fingers crossed), we are analyzing our R22 acquisition data for ODS that we would like to destroy under the Washington program. We have isolated a number of ISO tanks that contain...↓ R22 and I think there will likely be other developers that have a similar situation that I will describe below.

We’ve collected significant amounts of R22 mainly for resale. When we reclaim this gas, we store this in bulk quantities in ISO tanks and then will eventually fill smaller tanks from these ISOs for packaging and distribution. It is common that we will only have requisite point of origin details for a portion of the gas that is included in these ISO tanks. For the portion of gas that we have point of origin details on, we’d like to be able to transfer that mass to a different ISO tank and then we’d destroy all of the contents of the ISO tanks for which we hold point or origin documentation per protocol requirements. This is a mass balance approach and I think is logical particularly for a situation like this where R22 has never been eligible in a compliance market before.

This said, there is a section of the proposed revision that is a carry over from previous ARB versions that would likely disqualify this scenario. That is section 6.2(c)(4) which states:

When ODS is added to a single container which is part of a stockpile and a portion of the ODS is subsequently removed from the container, the ODS removed must be considered the ODS stored the longest (i.e., first-in, first-out method).

The issue here is that, the ODS stored the longest in a particular ISO may not be the gas that we have point of origin details for (i.e. we know when an ISO tank was filled but lack acquisition details on some of the gas that goes into each ISO). I’m not sure when/by whom that particular section of the methodology is used and don’t think it should be used to penalize a situation like this where a mass balance approach would be reasonable.

Could you please let us know your thoughts on this? Happy to have a call to discuss further as well.

Eric 

Good morning, I am Beth Porter, B-E-T-H P-O-R-T-E-R speaking on behalf of the Environmental Investigation Agency or EIA. We appreciate this opportunity to submit oral comment on the proposed update to the ODS offsets protocol. EIA is an independent o...↓rganization working globally to protect the climate, forest, and threatened species. We’ve undertaken investigations into the illegal trade in ODS and other fluorinated gases such as HFCS and have been closely involved in international and domestic ozone and climate policies with these substances for several decades. We appreciate Washington’s efforts to address the refrigerant banks of ODS that are contained in old equipment, foams, and stockpiles. As we know, there is a significant climate mitigation opportunity by curbing these emissions through the improved recovery for reuse, reclamation and destruction of these. However, we do encourage Ecology to not allow credit generation from HCFC-22 at this time. Reuse and reclamation will be key to meeting the servicing needs in the near term, amidst the national phasedown of HFC refrigerants. This is in order to reduce demand for newly produced refrigerants and to afford system operators the time to transition to those sustainable alternatives. We’re concerned that creating incentives now for HCFC-22 destruction could pose challenges to bolstering the recovery of these refrigerants in the state. EIA does agree that the appropriate destruction of these substances is a really important aspect of improved life cycle management for refrigerants. As we have expressed in the prior working group on this topic and written comments, there are some challenges with the use of offsets that we see as threatening to undermine the climate gains from these activities. So we urge Ecology to consider how certain controlled substances like R-22 are still being produced as feedstock, even though their production as an end product has been restricted. So we see when a financial incentive for destruction is attached to a substance still in production, there is a risk of creating a reverse incentive. A primary example of this is the clean development mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol, which offered credits for the destruction of HFC-23, a highly potent greenhouse gas and by product of 22 [HCFC-22] production. We saw that this resulted in an increased production of HCFC-22 solely to boost the byproduct for destruction as the credits were more lucrative than the products themselves. Because of this history, these challenges, we encourage Ecology to refrain from allowing credit generation for HCFC-22 destruction at this time. Instead, we urge the state to pursue other methods to support sustainable proper end-of-life management of these potent gases. We’ve provided some further details outlining these concerns with additional information and some recommendations for the department in our written comment, and very much continue to welcome discussion on this topic and appreciate Ecology and all that you are doing to try to protect our climate and ozone layer from these substances. Thank you so much for the time today.